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AGENCY
WIBSTER M nS, TR.*
Master and Servant
South Carolina Industrial Comm'n v. Progressive Life Ins.
o.' involved an action to determine whether an insurance com-
pany was subject to the Workmen's Compensation Act. The com-
pany claimed that its agents were not employees but independent
contractors. The South Carolina Supreme Court held the agents
to be employees relying upon the degree of control as being "the
essential criterion." Facts the court considered important in find-
ing sufficient control included: a guaranteed weekly wage, com-
pany furnished supplies, territories determined by the company,
constant supervision, group insurance, use of Form W-2 and, the
reservation by the company to fire at will without liability.
In lutson v. Herndon2 a variation of the borrowed servant
doctrine was before the court. The plaintiff and her husband
leased trucks to the defendant under a trip-lease agreement. The
plaintiff's husband agreed to drive one of the trucks and while
doing so negligently injured the plaintiff. The plaintiff pre-
vailed on the theory that her husband became the servant of the
defendant. The court properly emphasized that the right to con-
trol rather than the actual exercise of control is the crucial test.3
The trip-lease agreement provided: "that the leased equipment
under this agreement is in the exclusive possession, control,
and use" of the defendant, he expressly assuming full responsi-
bility in respect to its operation. 4 The court decided that such
language was sufficiently broad to give the defendant the right
to fully control the truck and its driver.
Principal and Agent
Allen v. Grimsley5 involved a suit by a purchaser for breach
of a general warranty contained in a deed. The property was
encumbered by a mortgage, the seller being the mortgagor. The
real estate broker handling the transaction informed the pur-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of South Carolina.
1. 242 S.C. 547, 131 S.E.2d 694 (1963).
2. 243 S.C. 257, 133 S.E.2d 753 (1963).
3. See generally MECHEM, AGENCY § 415 (4th ed. 1952).
4. 243 S.C. 257, 260, 133 S.E.2d 753, 755 (1963).
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chaser that this mortgage would have to be satisfied and received
from the purchaser a down payment for that purpose. The broker
subsequently defaulted without paying the mortgage. The court
affirmed a judgment for the purchaser.
The seller argued that the broker was not his agent. The court
limited its inquiry to whether there was ". . . sufficient compe-
tent evidence to support the finding of fact . . ." that the broker
was an agent of the seller." Several inferences from the evidence
weakened the seller's case. First, the seller knew the broker failed
to satisfy the mortgage and did not take action. Second, the com-
mission would have been paid by the seller. In addition, the
broker had his sign on the seller's property; he had handled other
sales for the seller in the past, and the seller was seen occasionally
in the broker's office.
A point not discussed was, assuming the agency relationship
existed, did the broker have authority to receive the down pay-
ment? Usually the broker does receive whatever closing payments
are required in real estate transactions. Such payments normally
accompany the transaction, and if the broker represents the seller,
it is only fair the seller should suffer any risks arising from his
own absence and choice of agent7
In Bost v. Bankers Fire & Marine Ins. (7o.8 one issue was
whether facts known to the agent are imputed to the principal.0
The evidence supported a finding that the insurance agent re-
ceived notice outside the course of his agency duties that the
insured was moving the property to another location in violation
of the policy. The court held that if the knowledge was of the
type he should act upon then it is imputed to the principal. 10
6. Id. at 403, 134 S.E2d at 214.
7. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 71 (1957):
Unless otherwise agreed, authority to receive payment is inferred from
authority to conduct a transaction if the receipt of payment is incidental
to such a transaction, usually accompanies it, or is a reasonably necessary
means for accomplishing it.
8. 242 S.C. 274, 130 S.E.2d 907 (1963).
9. The case involved several questions of insurance law. For example, the
defendant claimed that no agency existed. Without resorting to general agency
principles, the court rejected this contention on the basis of S.C. CODE ANN.
§37-233 (1962), which defines agents of insurance companies.
10. Some courts will not impute the knowledge which the agent receives apart
from his relationship to the transaction. This view is clearly rejected in South
Carolina. See Aiken Petroleum Co. v. National Petroleum Underwriters, 207
S.C. 236, 36 S.E.2d 380 (1945). The South Carolina view is preferable since
the agent is under a clear duty to inform the principal of important matters
relative to the agency. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 381 (1957).
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The jury verdict that the principal waived its right and was
estopped because of imputed knowledge was reinstated.
The issue of whether a person is an agent for the purpose of
service of process was raised in Lawson v. Jeter."- The court
quoted with approval from the circuit court's order:
There is no contract establishing any agency relation-
ship between them. But from the evidence I find that the
corporate defendant has no interest in or control whatever
over Mobley L. Jeter's equipment, his employees, or his
means and methods of conducting his business. The relation-
ship is simply that of buyer and seller. Mr. Jeter buys dairy
pi'oducts from the corporation and resells them to his cus-
tomers as an ordinary merchant in the normal course of busi-
ness. Title to the products pass to him upon delivery to him
within this State and he pays the corporation for such prod-
ucts when billed for the same; but when and to whom and on
what terms he resells such products are matters within his
sole discretion. The mere fact that the brand name "Sealtest"
is displayed on Jeter's trucks in connection with his own
name as distributor is, in my opinion, entirely insufficient to
sustain plaintiff's contentions.12
11. 243 S.C. 103, 132 S.E.2d 276 (1963).
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